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The paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of financial markets
and macroeconomy. In the model, long-term debt is extended to firms in a
primary market and then traded in a secondary market among financiers. Two
financial frictions that are ex-ante and ex-post with respect to the secondary
market trading date raise the cost of debt finance. In stationary equilibrium,
while ex-ante frictions are always counterproductive, financing costs that are
ex-post could promote macroeconomic growth. I show that a model consistent
with the U.S. financial development experience of the last 30 years is likely to
exhibit declining ex-post frictions.
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The absence of short-run cash-flows from an investment project could be related to
poor as well as to slow output realization. While the former state is clearly a bad
economic outcome, the same is not necessarily true for the latter. Financiers might
lack the time and the capital to uncover which one is the true state of the world.
Therefore, lowering lending imperfections and facilitating the trade of financial
instruments in secondary markets could stimulate an economy’s ability to provide
long-term finance. In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium model that is
consistent with the stylized features of the U.S. financial development experience
over the last 30 years, and show that the interactions between lending imperfections
and the secondary market trade carry inconvenient implications for the aggregate
supply of long-term debt and the macroeconomy.
The model has the essential features of a dynamic general equilibrium framework:
(i) Entrepreneurs, depositors and financiers specialize in complementary activities
by taking equilibrium prices as given; and, (ii) decisions of today affect the macroe-
conomic performance of tomorrow. In the model, long-term debt is vital to finance
the productivity enhancing projects, where debt is extended to entrepreneurs in a
primary investment market and then exchanged in a secondary market between fi-
nanciers - with heterogeneous consumption propensities. Two financial frictions
associated with long-term debt that prevail ex-ante and ex-post with respect to the
secondary market trading date raise the cost of firms’ debt finance. Following Hen-
nessy and Zechner (2011), I motivate these two frictions as a two-staged commit-
ment problem: An entrepreneur’s commitment to not divert entrepreneurial capital
before the secondary market trade, and after the trade entrepreneur’s commitment
to repay are enforceable only if financiers show some effort.1
The general equilibrium analysis reveals that lowering the ex-post cost of long-term
debt finance could reduce the corporate debt supplied and the macroeconomic out-
put of the economy. The key mechanism underlying this highlighted result is driven
by a general equilibrium feedback effect: As the ex-post cost of financing declines
1Chart 1 summarizes the investment-finance relationships in the model.
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relative to the ex-ante cost, the demand in the secondary market rises, increasing
the prices and the volume of secondary market trade, and crowding out the primary
debt supply. When the ex-post financing cost is not too large, the secondary market
effect could slow down the macroeconomy.
The model can account for the key stylized features of the U.S. financial devel-
opment experience over the last few decades. Since 1980s, information technology
has increased efficiency and lowered transaction costs throughout the economy. The
sharp decline in transaction costs reduced financial imperfections and fostered fi-
nancial development. The following three stylized observations are crucial for the
analysis of the current paper:
1. Financial services industry grew disproportionately compared to the rest of
the economy since 1980s. For instance, Philippon (2008) and Philippon
and Reshef (2012) document that in 1990, the financial sector accounted for
5.65% of the U.S. GDP and 6.11% of the aggregate employment compensa-
tion. In 2005, these fractions became 7.69% and 7.65% respectively. Recent
empirical evidence shows that as of February 2013, the total compensation of
the financial sector (including profits, wages, salary and bonuses) as a fraction
of GDP hit an all-time high, around 9% of the U.S. GDP.
2. Since 1980s, the U.S. secondary markets that allow the trade of long-term
financial instruments grew exponentially. For instance, the volume of sec-
ondary debt markets have exhibited a tremendous development, rising from
an annual volume of about 10 billion U.S. Dollars in 1990 to 400 billion U.S.
Dollars in 2012.
3. Over the same time-period the aggregate stock of debt instruments available
for the corporate sector was more or less stable - rising only slightly from
6.04% of the U.S. GDP in 1990 to 6.14% in 2005.
Did the growth of the U.S. financial industry over the recent decades contribute
to the long-run macroeconomic growth of the U.S. economy? Or, has financial
development simply gone too far as argued among others also by Rajan (2005). This
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paper aims to shed light on this important question from a novel general equilibrium
angle. The key argument of the paper is that the growth of the financial sector
could facilitate as well as slow down the macroeconomic performance; and, the
interactions between the financial frictions - that determine the size of the finance
sector - and secondary financial markets are key to understand the conditions for
counterproductive financial development.
The dynamic general equilibrium model that I study in this paper captures the first
essential feature highlighted above. Specifically, in all stationary equilibria of the
model the reductions in ex-ante and ex-post frictions stimulate the size of the finan-
cial sector and raise the compensation of financiers. The difference between two
debt financing costs becomes prevalent when we compare the equilibrium implica-
tions of the model in matching the stylized empirical facts (ii) and (iii). Specifi-
cally, reducing the ex-ante cost of debt financing lowers the trading volume in the
secondary market and stimulates the supply of corporate debt. On the contrary,
reducing the ex-post cost of debt financing facilitates the trading volume in the sec-
ondary market, and have the potential for stagnating the debt finance supplied to
the corporate sector. Therefore, a financial development experience that aims to
account for the secondary debt market growth should incorporate declining ex-post
frictions. As the key theoretical result of the paper shows ex-post financial frictions
are not necessarily barriers to long-run economic growth.
Related Literature: The theoretical findings of the paper shed light on the dark-
side of the secondary market trading. Several studies emphasized that the size of
secondary financial markets could hinder the capital formation and macroeconomic
performance. Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1995, 1996 and 2000) are seminal stud-
ies in this literature. Different from this existing literature, in this paper I develop a
model with micro-founded financial transaction costs - that are heterogeneous with
respect to their timing relative to the secondary market trading date - and show that
(a) secondary markets contract and macroeconomic performance expands unam-
biguously when ex-ante frictions decline and (b) reducing ex-post frictions stim-
ulates the size of the secondary market while it might reduce the macroeconomic
output.
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The paper also contributes to the broad literature on Finance and Macroeconomy.
Some of the important studies in this literature are Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990),
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Antunes et al. (2008),
and Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2010).2 This paper is essentially
related to the literature that identifies non-monotone real effects of financial sec-
tor development. Some studies in this area of research are Fatouh (2002), Cas-
tro, Clementi and MacDonald (2004), and Uras (2012). In these studies, the non-
monotonicity between finance and macroeconomic performance arises if quantities
of some particular macroeconomic variable, such as the steady-state capital stock
(Castro, Clementi and MacDonald (2004)) or the population weight of firms with
an access to a long-term production technology (Uras (2012)) do not reach a critical
level. Different from the approach of these studies, in the current paper, the non-
monotonicity between finance and macroeconomy depends not only on the stage
of economic development but also on the structure of the financial sector and the
underlying microfoundations that determine the cost of debt finance. The current
study is the first in pointing out this specific issue about the potential counterpro-
ductivity of financial development.
There is a large number of empirical papers, such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, (1998), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Beck and Levine
(2002), motivated to identify causal effects of legal and financial institutions which
include creditor protection, debt enforcement, and investor rights on long-run macroe-
conomic performance. Most of the studies in this literature employ a wholistic ap-
proach and study how the quality of a collection of institutions affect the macroeco-
nomic well-being. A more recent strand of the literature studies the quality of indi-
vidual institutions in isolation and suggests empirical evidence to be skeptical about
the macroeconomic implications of financial development. For example Castro et
al. (2004) concentrate on institutions that foster investor protection and show that
investor protection and macroeconomic output do not follow a positive correlation
for high income countries. As another example, Hasselman et al. (2010) breakdown
the debt enforcement institution into its components as collateral enforcement and
2Other important studies in this literature are Marcet and Marimon (1992), Acemoglu and Zilli-
botti (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Azariadis and Kaas (2007), and Antunes et al. (2008).
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bankruptcy enforcement. The authors use cross-country panel regressions to study
the effects of collateral and bankruptcy in isolation, and show that collateral en-
forcement has positive explanatory power on aggregate bank finance. The quality
of bankruptcy institutions on the other hand turns out to be insignificant in explain-
ing the aggregate size of outstanding bank loans. Motivated with the findings of
this recent literature, my theoretical analysis in this paper decomposes the financ-
ing costs of long-term debt contracts into two microfounded frictions in a dynamic
general equilibrium model and studies the impact of each friction on the behavior
of corporate debt markets and the macroeconomy.
Closely related to this paper, there is also a large literature on financing frictions,
entrepreneurship and macroeconomy. For example, Philippon (2010) derives opti-
mality of the financial sector taxation when entrepreneurship requires the debt en-
forcement services of the financial industry. Similarly, Erosa (2001) shows that fi-
nancial intermediation costs can explain the cross-country differences in per-capita
income and average business size. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Antunes et al.
(2008) study the effects of enforceability of debt finance on entrepreneurship and
macroeconomic development, Midrigan and Xu (2013) and Gilchrist et al.(2013)
analyze enforcement constraints and misallocation. Amaral and Quintin (2006)
and D’Erasmo and Boedo (2012) show that financial constraints generated by lim-
ited enforceability increases the size of the informal sector. This literature stud-
ies enforcement frictions with short-term (one period) debt contracts along-side a
one-period enforcement problem. Different from the existing research my analysis
incorporates two-period debt contracts in a dynamic general model and studies the
macroeconomic implications of debt finance frictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model
environment. Sections 3-6 study the macroeconomic implications of several finan-
cial development experiments. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider an overlapping generations economy as in Diamond (1965), where time is
indexed with t and continues forever. There is a single good that can be consumed
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or invested. Each period a continuum of risk-neutral agents enter the economy -
indexed by i ∈ [0,M ] - and live for two periods. I will call the periods in an agent’s
life-cycle as young and old and denote the consumption of an individual i from
generation t+ 1− j at time t with cijt. The lifetime utility of the agent i is





At the beginning of the two-period life-cycle agents select into one of the follow-
ing occupations: Worker, Financier, or Entrepreneur. There are three markets in
the economy: the Deposit Market, the Primary Debt Market, and the Secondary
Debt Market. Financiers are the intermediaries in the model; and therefore, they
interact in all three markets, whereas workers and entrepreneurs can respectively
access to the deposit and the primary debt markets only. The characteristics of the
occupations and the markets are delineated as follows.
Young workers have access to a constant returns to scale technology that converts
labor hours into the consumption good. In return of their labor efforts, workers
receive a salary payment - worth of 1 unit of consumption - at the end of the youth
period. Workers do not receive any wage income when old. In order to finance
the old-period consumption, they have to deposit fractions of the youth salary with
financiers at the competitive rate of deposit repayment, Rd.
Each financier collects a sum of deposits (d̃) from young workers, convert them
into units of finance (w̃) and provide investable funds in primary and secondary
markets.
Assumption 1. w̃t(d̃t) = min{d̃t, Bd̃βt }, with B > 0 and 0 < β < 1.
Assumption 1 implies that the conversion of deposits-into-finance exhibits span of
control, where each unit of deposit can be transformed into at most one unit of
finance. The strict decreasing returns scale property becomes binding when the
amount of deposits demanded by a financier is large enough, such that d̃ > B
1
1−β .
Financiers keep Rf units of consumption good from returns to finance as their own
compensation. Similar to the deposit rate, Rd, the financier’s compensation Rf will
also be determined in the general equilibrium.
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Entrepreneurs operate a production technology - a long-term project - that takes
two periods to generate cash-flow and uses capital in addition to entrepreneur’s time
as production inputs. Specifically, for each k̃t units of capital raised in the primary
debt market with a two-period unit cost of finance R̂t, a young entrepreneur’s pro-
duction technology will deliver `t+1(k̃t) units of the consumption good (cash) when
the entrepreneur becomes old.
Assumption 2. `t+1(k̃t) = Atk̃αt , with 0 < α < 1.
Productivity. The productivity of the project, At, in any given period t is a function
of the aggregate output produced by entrepreneurial projects in period t−1. I denote
the aggregate output produced by entrepreneurial projects with W , and formalize
the productivity process in the economy with the following assumption.
Assumption 3. At = Ā [1 + g (Wt−1)] with Wt−1 ≡
∫
Me,t−1
`i,t−1di; and, g′(.) > 0
and g′(.) ≤ 0.
This assumption states that there are inter-generational knowledge spillovers in the
form of productivity enhancing investment: Entrepreneurial output of today deter-
mines the aggregate entrepreneurial productivity of tomorrow. Productivity enhanc-
ing investment of this form is a stylized feature of endogenous growth models with
overlapping generations as for example in Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1995, 1996
and 2000), and Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2010). It is easy to see
that with the entrepreneurial technology at assumption 2 and the productivity pro-
cess specified at assumption 3, a unique and stable A exists as long as g′(W ) > 0
and g′′(W ) ≤ 0.
Secondary Market Trading. Workers are the suppliers of investable funds and en-
trepreneurs are the users of funds. Financiers are the intermediaries: They convert
deposits into finance and supply input for entrepreneurial production. Financiers
perform a maturity transformation function in the economy . Positive measures of
entrepreneurship could prevail in equilibria only with maturity transformation, be-
cause workers have access to earnings for only a short-while (one-period) whereas
the entrepreneurial projects are long-term (two-period). The maturity transforma-
tion is sustained through secondary market trading. There are primary and sec-
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ondary financiers of entrepreneurial investment projects. Primary financiers ex-
tend long-term debt to entrepreneurs at the beginning of a period t and receive debt
claims against next period’s (t+1) cash-flows. Secondary financiers purchase these
debt claims from primary financiers in the secondary market at the end of the pe-
riod t and collect the capital returns from entrepreneurs upon the finalization of
long-term projects in period t + 1. The timing of secondary market trading im-
plies that primary financiers are old whereas secondary financiers are young when
primary and secondary market investment takes place respectively.
I allow any convex combination of the two financing options - primary and sec-
ondary market finance - for a particular financier. That means, financiers can uti-
lize deposits that they convert into units of finance to directly invest in new en-
trepreneurial projects as well as to purchase debt claims against returns from old
entrepreneurial projects.
Frictions. In investigating the macroeconomic implications of financial develop-
ment, I consider two frictions, that are ex-ante and ex-post with respect to the sec-
ondary market trading date. Both frictions are measured in terms of financier ef-
forts, and are proportional to the per-unit capital repayment of the entrepreneur. I
let R̂ denote the unit rate of capital repayment and assume that ex-ante and ex-post
frictions cause disutility to the financier worth of
vex−ante = ψ1R̂tk̃t, and
vex−post = ψ2R̂tk̃t (1)
units of consumption with 0 < ψ1 < 1 and 0 < ψ2 < 1. Throughout the anal-
ysis, I will assume that the effort of financiers are perfectly observable and fairly
priced. Following Hennessy and Zechner (2011), we could motivate the sequence of
ex-ante and ex-post financing frictions as a two-staged financial imperfection: En-
trepreneur’s commitment to not divert entrepreneurial capital before the secondary
market trading, and after the trade takes place entrepreneur’s commitment to repay
are enforceable only if financiers show some effort. The parameters ψ1 and ψ2 are
the key policy variables of the study, both of which jointly determine the stage of
9
financial development in a society.
Timing. In any given period t there are two sub-periods. I name the first sub-period
as the day and the second sub-period as the night. The events that occur in each
respective sub-period are as follows:
• Day:
1. Young agents select into occupations.
2. Primary debt market opens, and old financiers provide two-period debt
to young entrepreneurs against period t+ 1 debt claims.
3. Primary debt market closes.
4. Old primary financiers incur the ex-ante cost of holding entrepreneurial
debt.
5. Entrepreneurs invest in long-term projects.
• Night:
1. Young workers receive the wage income.
2. Young financiers collect deposits from young workers.
3. Secondary debt market opens. Young financiers use fractions of the de-
posits to purchase debt claims against period t+1 long-term investment
returns from old financiers. In other words, old-financiers, who have
extended long-term debt to young entrepreneurs in the day sub-period,
sell debt claims to young financiers.
4. Secondary market closes.
5. Old entrepreneurs collect investment returns from projects started in the
day sub-period in t− 1.
6. Old secondary financiers incur the ex-post cost of holding entrepreneurial
debt and collect debt repayment from entrepreneurs.
7. Old workers receive deposit repayment.
8. Agents consume.
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An interpretation of the model and the key question. The economic model I
developed is closely related to Banerjee and Newman’s (1993) occupation choice
model of financial development. In both models when financial frictions are in-
finitely large - which is the case here when ψ1 and/or ψ2 equals to 1 - the economy is
in an autarkic (no-trade) state. For instance in the context of my model, the autarky
is an equilibrium where every agent chooses to become a worker at the beginning
of his life-time, earns a wage income worth of 1 unit of the consumption good and
consumes it. When financial frictions are not so severe - ψ1 and ψ2 sufficiently
smaller than 1 - the entrepreneurship sector emerges. Different from Banerjee and
Newman (1993), in my theoretical framework financial intermediary sector exhibits
growth following a reduction in financing frictions and channels funds from work-
ers to entrepreneurs. The key question I am interested in addressing in sections
3 through 6 is whether the growth of the intermediary sector necessarily co-exist
with the growth in the long-term debt supply and the macroeconomic output. The
answer is not necessarily.
3 Financial Markets with Ex-ante Costs of Debt Fi-
nance
In this section, I ignore the ex-post costs of holding debt claims and consider an
economy with ex-ante financing frictions only. This means only primary debt fi-
nanciers - who directly contact entrepreneurs - incur the effort costs. Using the
parameters introduced in the previous section, this implies that ψ1 > 0 and ψ2 = 0,
as presented in Chart 2.
CHART 2 ABOUT HERE
The cost of holding debt ex-ante to the secondary market trading date can be moti-
vated with a Hart and Moore (1986) type of friction: If an entrepreneur quits from
a project right after the debt is extended, the project as well as the the debt claim
becomes worthless. In order to enforce project implementability financiers might
need to spend resources, where the implementation of the project becomes costlier
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with the size of the debt repayment3.
3.1 Optimizing Behavior
Workers. Risk neutrality implies that workers deposit the unit wage compensation
from the youth period as long as the competitive deposit repayment rate is large
enough (Rd,t ≥ 1), such that the equilibrium is non-autarkic. For Rd,t ≥ 1 a
worker’s lifetime utility satisfies Vw,t = Rd,t.
Financiers. The lifetime utility of a financier is denoted with Vf,t which equals
to Rf,t, financier’s end of life-time compensation. Risk-neutrality also implies that
financiers consume their compensation at the end of the old period as well.






t − R̂t+1k̃αt .
Entrepreneur’s optimal capital demand kt and the life-time value of being an en-















3.2 The General Equilibrium Analysis
Definition The dynamic general equilibrium of the economy is characterized by
streams of primary financier returns to capital - net of effort costs - ({R1t}t=∞t=0 )
and secondary financier returns ({R2t}t=∞t=0 ), return on deposits ({Rd,t}t=∞t=0 ), cost of
long-term debt ({R̂t}t=∞t=0 ) and prices of debt claims in the secondary debt market
3As seminal examples of general equilibrium models with debt frictions, Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Matsuyama (2004) work with reduced form specifications of the Hart and Moore fric-
tions as well.
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({pt}t=∞t=0 ) at which
1. Agents optimize their life-time utility,
2. Life-time income from the three occupation choices are equalized, such that
Vw,t = Vf,t = Ve,t, (2)
3. The life-time value from being a primary debt market financier (V 1f,t) is equal
to the life-time value of a secondary market financier (V 2f,t), such that
V 1f,t = V
2
f,t, (3)
4. Deposit market, primary and secondary debt markets clear.
Defining (1 − ψ1) ≡ 11+φ , in equilibrium primary financier’s unit return from en-
trepreneurial finance net of effort costs satisfies R1t =
pt
1+φ
. Clearly, in a no-autarky
equilibrium R1t > 1, and positive measures of financier and entrepreneur popula-
tions prevail in the general equilibrium. The life-time value indifference between
primary and secondary financiers then implies the results obtained in the following
two lemma.
Lemma 1 In a no-autarky equilibrium, (i) the primary and secondary financiers’
unit return from finance - net of effort costs - are equalized such thatR1t = R
2
t = Rt,
and (ii) the unit cost of two-period finance for an entrepreneur satisfies R̂t+1 =
RtRt+1(1 + φ).
Proof The unit investment return from secondary market finance is inversely re-














should hold; otherwise, all financiers strictly prefer to be either a financier in the
primary debt market or a financier in the secondary market, and under either case
finance cannot become available for entrepreneurs. Defining Rt ≡ R1t+1 = R2t+1,
R̂t+1 = RtRt+1(1 + φ) holds in equilibrium. 
Lemma 2 The model exhibits a unique stationary equilibrium characterized by a
constant R in all time periods and an invariant distribution of workers, financiers
and entrepreneurs across all cohorts.
Proof The stationarity of the productivity of entrepreneurial projects implies that
the rate of return from entrepreneurial finance eventually reaches a steady-state
level. Therefore, the return to finance in primary and secondary debt markets are
also constant implying a unique steady-state distribution between entrepreneurship
and the remaining occupations. Given worker’s exogenous wage compensation,
the assumption 1 implies a unique steady-state distribution between workers and
financiers. 
For the rest of the analysis, I will concentrate on the unique steady-state equilibrium
of the model while studying the effects of financial development on asset returns,
distribution of occupations and the macroeconomic performance.
Financier-Worker Ratio. The steady-state ratio between population measures of
financiers (Mf ) and workers (Mw) is independent of the level of financing frictions.
To observe this, we need to first note that each financier solves the following pro-
gram to maximize the total quantity of finance produced by taking the return from




The first order conditions yield:
Rw̃′(d̃) = Rd. (5)
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There are two special cases to consider: (i) w̃′(d̃) = 1, with R = Rd, and (ii)
w̃′(d̃) < 1, with R > Rd. In case (i), the financier does not make any private
returns from providing finance; and therefore, the equilibrium is an autarky. In
case (ii), financial intermediation as well as entrepreneurial investment do prevail
in the general equilibrium. I will concentrate on parameterizations of the model that
support the case (ii) with d > w where d and w are optimum quantities of deposits
collected and finance generated by each financier in a stationary equilibrium.4
In order to derive the optimum quantity of deposits collected, d, and the optimum
















The indifference condition between being a worker and a financier solves for Rd





= RBββ(1− β)1−β. (6)




















4The case of d > w is also empirically plausible than the case with d = w, since financial
intermediaries convert only a fraction of their deposits into investable funds.
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The ratio between population measures of financiers and workers is then indepen-
dent of the level of the society’s financial market efficiency.
Proposition 3.1 The deposit market clearance condition yields the population ratio







Proof Since each worker receives a unit salary payment at the end of the youth
period, the aggregate stock of deposits equals to Mw. The demand for deposits by
each financier is β
1−β . Therefore, the financier-worker distribution in the steady-
state equals to 1−β
β
. .
Financier-Entrepreneur Ratio. In order to solve for the the population ratio
between financiers and entrepreneurs, at first, we need to observe that the en-
trepreneur’s cost of finance in the steady-state equilibrium is
R̂(φ) = R2(1 + φ).
The unit price of a debt claim in the secondary market, p, should then satisfy
p(φ) = R(1 + φ).
We can express the occupation indifference between being a worker, a financier -
net of effort costs - and an entrepreneur as the following



























provides the closed-form solution for the key variable of interest of the general
equilibrium analysis. The return from providing finance,R, is a decreasing function
of the ex-ante financing friction φ. Since Rf (and also Rd) is also linear in R, the
equilibrium life-time income of a financier is also decreasing in ex-ante financing
frictions.5 This general equilibrium property implies that financial development
makes the “intermediary-sector” attractive.
Given R, the two-period cost of capital R̂ and the secondary market price of debt
claims p can both be expressed as functions of φ as well:
R̂(φ) = R2(1 + φ) ∝ (1 + φ)
1−α
1+α , (11)
p(φ) = R(1 + φ) ∝ (1 + φ)
1
1+α . (12)
Ex-ante financing frictions make the entrepreneurial finance and the purchase of
debt claims in the secondary market costlier.
In the stationary equilibrium, each financier invests a constant fraction of his fi-
nancial endowment in the primary debt market. I denote the steady-state primary
market investment of each financier by x. The aggregate finance invested in long-
term entrepreneurial projects then equals to Mfx, and the aggregate compensa-












1 +R(1 + φ)
. (13)
Since p increases with φ, the steady-state debt-finance provided by each financier
rises with financial development. To understand whether the size of the financial
sector expands with declining financial frictions, we need to derive an expression
for the equilibrium measure of financiers in the economy (Mf ) as a function of φ.
This, we can do by solving for the market clearance condition of the primary debt
5The rise in the rate of return on capital as financial frictions contract is a standard feature of


















































1 +R(1 + φ)
R(1 + φ)
. (14)
The population measures of workers, financiers and entrepreneurs then can be de-













The equations (15), (16) and (17) imply that the population measure of workers
and financiers are decreasing functions of φ whereas the population measure of
entrepreneurs rises with φ. Since the aggregate compensation of financiers equals to
MfRf , andRf decreases with φ as well, I obtain the following relationship between
the size of the financial sector and a permanent reduction in ex-ante financing cost
φ.
Proposition 3.2
If financial development reduces the effort costs related to the ex-ante financ-
ing frictions, then in the stationary equilibrium
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i. The total quantity of financiers increases with financial development.
ii. The total compensation of financiers relative to the aggregate income rises
with financial development.
The result in proposition 3.2 is a stylized feature of the U.S. financial development
experience over the last few decades. Financial services industry grew dispropor-
tionately compared to the rest of the economy since 1990s. According to Philippon
(2008) in 1990, the financial sector accounted for 5.65% of the U.S. GDP and 6.11%
of the aggregate employment compensation. As of February 2013, the total com-
pensation of the financial sector (including profits, wages, salary and bonuses) as a
fraction of GDP hit an all-time high, around 9% of the U.S. GDP.
Supply of Long-term Debt and the Secondary Market. Equilibrium in the sec-
ondary debt market implies that the ratio between the primary financiers and the










The aggregate ratio between primary financiers and secondary financiers rises as the
ex-ante cost of providing finance declines. Using equations (16) and (18) together,




α(1− β)(1 + p)
α + p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fin. Sec.
· 1
1 + p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sec. Mkt.
·Mw. (19)
Denoting the first partial derivative of p by p′ with p′ > 0 as shown above, the
first-partial derivative of K with respect to φ can be derived as
∂K
∂φ
= −α(1− β) p
′
(α + p)2
Mw < 0. (20)
There are two channels where financial development and the supply of long-term
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debt interact: (i) Financial development expands the size of the financing sector,
and (ii) the prices in the secondary market contract with financial development.
Both channels stimulate the primary debt supply and raise the input that goes into
entrepreneurial investment.
The size of the secondary market in the steady-state is measured as the aggregate
fraction of secondary financiers in the economy multiplied by the the quantity of
finance produced by each financier:
S = Mf2w
=
α(1− β)(1 + p)
α + p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fin. Sec.
· p
1 + p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sec. Mkt.
·Mw. (21)
The first-partial derivative of S with respect to φ is
∂S
∂φ
= α(1− β) αp
′
(α + p)2
Mw > 0. (22)
Similar to the supply of long-term debt, financial development affects the size of
the secondary market trading through two channels: (i) The increase in the size of
the financial sector stimulates the secondary market trading whereas (ii) declining
secondary market prices lower the size of the secondary market. The net effect is
negative, financial development and secondary market size are negatively related
when financial development reduces the financing frictions that are ex-ante with
respect to the secondary market trading date.
Proposition 3.3
If financial development reduces the effort costs related to the ex-ante financ-
ing frictions, then in the stationary equilibrium
i. the quantity of long-term debt increases with financial development,
ii. the size of the secondary market decreases with financial development.
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Steady-state Consumption.
I measure the long-run performance of the economy by the steady-state per-capita
consumption - net of effort costs. Denoting c as the consumption per-capita in the
steady-state of an old agent, from equation (9), we can derive:
c = w(1− β)R,











Steady-state consumption is a function of A, the productivity of long-term projects,


























where the steady-state long-term project productivity solves
A = Ā [1 + g(W (A))] .
Ex-ante financing frictions impact per-capita consumption - derived at (23) - through
two channels: (1) A direct effect - due to deadweight losses - and (2) an indirect ef-
fect through the impact of frictions on aggregate entrepreneurial output. The former
effect is clearly negative. Therefore, in order to evaluate whether ex-ante financing
frictions stimulate the per-capita consumption in steady-state we have to study com-
parative statics at the aggregate entrepreneurial output with respect to φ.
Financial Development and Macroeconomic Performance. Although financial
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development is expansionary for the aggregate capital invested in entrepreneurial
projects, it also comes with a growing financial sector which crowds out the total
number of entrepreneurs in the economy. Therefore, one needs to check whether
the aggregate output produced by long-term projects does in fact rise with financial
development. I define financial development as an event that occurs at the beginning
of a period τ (at stage-0 of the flow of events presented in section 2) and reduces
the cost of primary market debt finance, φ, permanently.
Differentiating (24) with respect to φ, we can show that lowering the ex-ante cost
of financing friction φ improves the steady-state aggregate output produced by en-
trepreneurial projects when
(1− α)2p−α(α + p) < (1− α)p1−α. (25)
Simplifying both sides at (25) yields
(1− α) < p. (26)
The rate of financial return, R, must exceed 1 to have a no-autarky equilibrium with
positive entrepreneurial investment. Since p > R, as long as the equilibrium is
non-autarkic, the condition at (26) is satisfied for all parameter values.
Proposition 3.4 The inequality at (26) is satisfied for all parameter values that
support an investment equilibrium. Lowering the primary financing friction - that
is ex-ante with respect to the secondary market trading date - stimulates the macroe-
conomic output generated by long-term projects and as a result the per-capita con-
sumption - net of effort costs - in the steady-state equilibrium.
Transitory Dynamics. A permanent reduction in φ in an arbitrary period τ stimu-
lates the aggregate output from long-term projects in the consecutive period (Wτ+1).
Since the productivity of long-term projects is time-dependent as specified at as-
sumption 3, a rise in current output from long-term projects translates into a higher
entrepreneurial productivity in the future. Therefore, comparing the steady-state
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values of productivity and entrepreneurial output (A,W ) against the productivity
and output in period τ + 1 (Aτ+1,Wτ+1) reveals that A > Aτ+1 and W > Wτ+1.
As depicted in figure 1 these results imply that future generations benefit from fi-
nancial development - in the form of an ex-ante financing friction alleviation - more
than the current generation who invests in institutions that reduce ex-ante financing
costs and promote the primary market trading. In order to observe this note that the
current generation (cohort born in period τ ) clearly benefits from financial devel-
opment since for constant A, the per-capita consumption in period in τ + 1 rises
as φ declines. The steady-state per-capita consumption, c, is strictly larger than the
per-capita consumption in period τ + 1, cτ+1, because the rise in W stimulates the
growth in A until a steady-state level is reached.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
3.3 Discussion
When the ex-ante financing friction is large the economy exhibits an inefficiently
undersized finance-sector because the rate of financial return is too small. Finan-
cial development stimulates the rates of return on providing finance, and causes an
expansion in the size of the finance-sector, and a leads to a rise in the primary debt
supply available for the entrepreneurial sector.
The key result that shows the steady-state consumption is a decreasing function of
φ has an intuitive interpretation. Permanent reductions in φ generate three effects
on the macroeconomy. (1) The population share of financiers (Mf ) rises as φ de-
creases. (2) The contraction in φ also mitigates the fraction of investable funds
that needs to be paid to primary financiers in secondary market transactions: p is
an increasing function of φ, and therefore the smaller φ the larger is the fraction
of the physical endowment stock that can be allocated to entrepreneurial produc-
tion. (3) The output produced by entrepreneurial projects rises with the expansion
of the debt stock which stimulates the future productivity of long-term projects in
the economy.
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The channels 1 and 2 foster a debt stock deepening whereas the channel 3 stimulates
the total factor productivity by improving the allocative efficiency of capital and as
a result stimulating inter-generational productivity spillovers. Lowering the effort
cost of primary debt finance impacts the steady-state per-capita consumption - net
of effort costs - through all three channels.
4 Financial Markets with Ex-post Costs of Debt Fi-
nance
In this section, I explore the behavior of an economy with debt financing costs that
are ex-post with respect to the secondary market trading date. Using the parameters
introduced in section 2, this implies that ψ1 = 0 and ψ2 > 0, as I illustrate in chart
3. Ex-post debt financing costs can be rationalized with a costly debt repayment
friction.6 For instance, imperfect bankruptcy regulation would increase the efforts
of a financier that he needs to incur in order to obtain the full repayment from an
entrepreneurial project. Therefore, strict bankruptcy regulation could function as
a mean of enforcing entrepreneurs’ debt repayment to financiers and stimulate the
aggregate supply of entrepreneurial debt finance. My analysis in this section argues
that the general equilibrium feedback effects - through secondary market adjust-
ment - have the potential of undoing the aggregate benefits of strong bankruptcy
regulation.
CHART 3 ABOUT HERE
4.1 Optimizing Behavior
The optimization programs of workers, financiers, and entrepreneurs; the defini-
tion of the dynamic general equilibrium; and finally, the existence result for the
6Seminal studies such as Townsend (1979) and Williamson (1986) provide costly state verifica-
tion as a microfoundation for the debt repayment friction.
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stationary equilibrium remains the same as in section 3. Since financier-worker dis-
tribution in the economy is independent of the financing frictions, the ratio between







Applying the convenient definition (1 − ψ2) ≡ 11+φ , the occupation indifference
condition between being a financier and an entrepreneur solves the unit rate of re-
















and for the unit cost of capital finance R̂(φ)
R̂(φ) = R2(1 + φ) ∝ (1 + φ)
1−α
1+α ,
as in section 3.
When financing frictions are ex-post with respect to the secondary market trading
date, the primary financiers do not directly incur the cost of long-term debt finance.















which implies that the secondary market price of debt rises following a permanent
reduction in ex-post financing frictions. Denoting the per-financier primary market
debt invested in entrepreneurial projects again by x, the aggregate debt stock in-
vested in long-term entrepreneurial projects equals to Mfx which implies that the
aggregate compensation of primary financiers must be Mfxp. Since in equilibrium














and observe that x increases with φ since p is a decreasing function of the ex-
post financing friction. That means the supply of long-term debt provided by each
financier in the primary debt market contracts with a financial development that
reduces the ex-post effort cost of providing finance.



























































The equation (29) shows that the Mf/Me ratio - similar to the financial regime 1
with costly primary debt market finance - increases as φ declines. The population




























As in section 3, I obtain the following relationship between the size of the financial
sector and financial development.
Proposition 4.1
If financial development reduces the effort costs related to the ex-post financ-
ing frictions, then in the general equilibrium
i. The total quantity of financiers increases with financial development.
ii. The total compensation of financiers relative to the aggregate income rises
with financial development.
Results 3.2 and 4.1 show that reducing ex-ante and ex-post financing costs stimu-
late the financial sector size as well as the aggregate compensation captured by the
financial sector.
Supply of Long-term Debt and the Secondary Market. Equilibrium in the sec-










Since p is a decreasing function of φ, the fraction of secondary debt financiers rises
as the ex-post financing costs decrease. Solving equations (31) and (33) together















1 + p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sec. Mkt.
·Mw. (34)
There are two counteracting channels where financial development and the supply
of long-term debt interact: (i) Financial development expands the size of the in-
termediary sector; however, (ii) the prices in the secondary market increase with
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financial development which suppresses the aggregate measure of primary market
finance relative to the secondary market finance. Denoting the first partial derivative
of p again with p′ where p′ < 0, the first-partial derivative of K with respect to φ


























> 0 if φ̄ > φ. (35)
Therefore, reducing the ex-post financing frictions, stimulates the primary debt sup-
ply if and only if the initial size of the friction is large enough.
The size of the secondary market in the steady-state is again measured as
S = Mf2w
=
α(1− β)(1 + p)
α + p+ (1− α)φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fin. Sec.
· p
1 + p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sec. Mkt.
·Mw. (36)
Since both the total quantity of financiers in the economy as well as the secondary




I summarize the two key results that I obtained regarding the relationship between
the size of the ex-post financing frictions and the behavior of financial markets with
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2
If financial development reduces the effort costs related to the ex-post financ-
ing frictions, then in the general equilibrium
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i. the supply of long-term debt increases with financial development if only if
ex-post financing frictions are large enough, or in other words if φ > φ̄ with
φ̄ as defined at (35),
ii. the size of the secondary market decreases with financial development.
Since 1980s, the U.S. secondary markets that allow the trade of long-term financial
instruments grew exponentially. For instance, the volume of secondary debt mar-
kets have exhibited a tremendous development, rising from an annual volume of
about 10 billion U.S. Dollars in 1990 to 400 billion U.S. Dollars in 2012. Over the
same time-period the aggregate stock of debt instruments available for the corporate
sector was more less stable - rising only slightly from 6.04% of the U.S. GDP in
1990 to 6.14% in 2005. The theoretical financial development exercise presented in
this section can provide a theoretical foundation for these stylized empirical facts.
Steady-state Consumption.
The steady-state expression for per-capita consumption net of effort costs has the
same closed form expression as in section 3:
c = w(1− β)R,











Ex-post financing frictions impact per-capita consumption through two channels
as well: (1) The direct deadweight loss effect and (2) the indirect effect through
the impact of frictions on aggregate entrepreneurial output. The former effect is
negative - as it was also the case with ex-ante financing frictions. In order to eval-
uate whether ex-post frictions stimulate the per-capita consumption in steady-state
we have to study comparative statics at the aggregate entrepreneurial output with
















When we define z ≡ 1−α
α
, and use (32) in W , W as a function of p is expressed as
W =
[p(1 + φ)]1−α
1 + p+ zp(1 + φ)
Az1−α [w(1− β)]αM. (39)
An important implication of the model is revealed when we compare the steady-
state aggregate output from entrepreneurial projects that we derived at (39) (with
p = R), against the aggregate entrepreneurial output at (24) (with p = R(1 + φ)):
Holding everything else constant, shifting the effort cost of finance from secondary
financiers to primary financiers such that p = R goes up to p = R(1 + φ) low-
ers the entrepreneurial project output. In order to observe this property note that
Wex−post > Wex−ante if and only if
1
α + αR + (1− α)R(1 + φ)
>
1
α +R(1 + φ)
,
which is satisfied as long as φ > 0. Since entrepreneurial investment is the engine of
the productivity growth in the economy, the steady-state productivity of an economy
governed by financial regime 2 (p = R) is higher than the steady-state productivity
of an economy with financial regime 1 (p = R(1 + φ)). I summarize this important
result with the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 Ceteris paribus, a financial regime that delegates the effort cost of
debt finance to primary financiers has lower aggregate productivity compared to a
regime where secondary financiers incur the cost of providing finance.
Financial Development and Macroeconomic Performance. I consider again a
financial development exercise at the beginning of a period τ that reduces the cost
ex-post financing friction φ permanently. As in section 3, I will first study the
effects of financial development on steady-state output produced by entrepreneurial
projects and then draw conclusions for the per-capita consumption in the steady-
state equilibrium.
In order to analyze the effects of a permanent reduction in φ on steady-state output
produced by entrepreneurs, I differentiate the expression at (39) with respect to φ,
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and show that ∂W
∂φ
< 0 if and only if:
[(1− α)p−α(1 + φ)1−αp′ + p1−α(1 + φ)−α][1 + p+ zp(1 + φ)] <
[1 + z(1 + φ)p′ + zp][p1−α(1 + φ)1−α],
which simplifies to:
(1− α)p−α(1 + φ)1−αp′︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡X
+ p1−α(1 + φ)−α(1 + p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< αp1−α(1 + φ)1−αp′︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− α)p1−α(1 + φ)2−αp′︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Y
. (40)
At inequality (40), all terms with p′ are negative. Since |Y | > |X| (as defined at
inequality (40)), it shows that the inequality (40) holds only if p < p̄ where p̄ is a
threshold with p̄ < 1. The inequality (40) does not hold for any parameter values
that satisfy a non-autarkic investment equilibrium.
Proposition 4.4 A permanent reduction in ex-post financing frictions lowers the
steady-state output produced by entrepreneurial projects.
Financial development through a reduction in ex-post financing frictions has two
effects on steady-state per-capita consumption: (1) The direct (positive) impact
that increases the consumption immediately following a reduction in financing fric-
tions and (2) the indirect (negative) impact that contracts the output from long-term
projects which suppresses A in steady-state. The net effect of financial develop-
ment on steady-state consumption depends on the relative weights between the two
channels. Optimizing the steady-state consumption derived at (38) with respect











where φ̂ is the optimum level of ex-post debt financing frictions.
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Transitory Dynamics. Following a permanent reduction of φ in period τ , A does
not adjust until period τ+2. Therefore, per-capita consumption in period τ+1 rises.
Since At steadily adjusts downwards with perpetual contractions in Wt, the per-
capita consumption in period τ+1 exceeds the steady-state per-capita consumption.
This is a result contrasting with the transitory dynamics derived in section 3. If
φ < φ̂, lowering enforcement costs further is counterproductive for steady-state
consumption. Figure 2 summarizes the dynamic implications of ex-post financing
frictions.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
4.2 Discussion
Comparing the results from sections 3 and 4 shows that understanding the micro-
foundations of debt finance frictions is important for uncovering the effects of fi-
nancial development on steady-state macroeconomic performance.
Why is financial development counterproductive when providing debt finance is
costly for secondary financiers? Because, excessive demand for secondary market
financial claims resulting in from low secondary finance costs generates an alloca-
tion of resources in the decentralized equilibrium that is sub-optimal. Therefore,
secondary finance friction φ could serve as a welfare-improving “tax-wedge” on
financial gains when secondary financiers incur the effort cost of providing finance.
This analytical conclusion has important empirical implications and also relevance
for financial market policies. Cross-country empirical evidence suggests that finan-
cial development and economic growth are not always positively associated. For
example, Bandiera et al. (2000) suggest that the effects of the domestic financial
liberalization on economic growth are mixed. The authors argue that for 1970-1994
time period, the relationship between banking deregulation and economic perfor-
mance is negative and significant in Korea and Mexico7, whereas it is positive and
7Similar conclusions are reached for Korea by Demetriades and Luintel (2001) and Castro et al.
(2004).
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significant in Turkey and Ghana. Pagano and Jappelli (1994) show that borrowing
limits and economic growth displayed a negative correlation during 1980s in OECD
countries, and Bayoumi (1993) found similar results for the United Kingdom for the
same time interval.
For developing countries, there are cases where well-intended financial develop-
ment policies reduced economic growth. For example, the Latin American coun-
tries experienced secular banking deregulation experiences during 1990s, which
according to Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), generated an under-supply of market
liquidity and undermined economic performance. The theoretical results presented
in sections 3 and 4 offer an understanding for the conditions that policy makers
should pay attention in order to avoid financial market policies with potential coun-
terproductive consequences, especially when long-term investment and liquid sec-
ondary markets are essential for the real economic performance.
5 Financial Markets with Uniform Cost of Debt Fi-
nance
De facto costs of providing debt finance are related to the efficiency of courts in
a society, and when court transaction costs decrease any type of financing friction
might get alleviated. Therefore, in this section I study a numerical exercise with
ψ1 = ψ2 ≡ ψ as presented in chart 4, such that ex-ante and ex-post financing
costs are both associated with the same level of financier effort. Again, I define
(1− ψ) = 1
1+φ
and study the aggregate implications of a contraction in φ.
CHART 4 ABOUT HERE
Following the same line of thinking applied in the previous two sections, we can
show that financiers’ returns, entrepreneurial cost of finance and the secondary mar-
ket price of debt in a stationary equilibrium are proportional to the financing friction
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φ as in the following:
R ∝ (1 + φ)
−2α
1+α ,
R̂ ∝ (1 + φ)
2−2α
1+α ,



















As I have also obtained in the previous two sections, Mf/Me goes up; and there-








implies that Mf1/Mf2 goes down as financing frictions decline. Therefore, the
equilibrium quantity of aggregate long-term debt,




rises with financial development.
Finally, the steady-state consumption net of financing effort costs and the aggregate
entrepreneurial production can be solved as
c = w(1− β)R




















5.1 A Numerical Exercise
In order to understand the numerical implications of debt financing costs across
three financial regimes, I simulate each regime using the same parameter values
and conduct financial development experiments. Table 1 summarizes, the param-
eterization of α, β, B, Ā, θ, and φ, and the steady-state values of aggregate
consumption, aggregate consumption net of enforcement costs, the relative size of
financial sector (Mf/Me), net financial return, the aggregate supply of long-term
debt K, the aggregate entrepreneurial production, and finally the aggregate long-
term productivity.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The model is parameterized such that the aggregate steady-state consumption for
the model presented in this section with uniform financing frictions equals to 100
in the steady-state. Across all three financial regimes the parameter that captures
the intermediary’s cost, φ, equals to 0.1.
As also predicted by proposition 4.3, the model with ex-post cost of providing fi-
nance has the highest steady-state net consumption in per-capita. Steady-state con-
sumption net of enforcement frictions in an economy where both types of interme-
diaries incur the financing costs exceeds that of the specification with only ex-ante
financing frictions.
Finally, table 2 presents a hypothetical policy experiment where I increase the debt
finance friction from 0.1 to 0.2 in all three financial regimes. Steady-state consump-
tion net of effort costs decreases by 5.73 units in uniform finance costs model, and
by 5.60 units in costly ex-ante financing model. In costly ex-post financing model
the same hypothetical financial repression leads to a rise in net consumption by 0.50
unit.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
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6 Financial Markets with Heterogeneous Effort Costs
of Debt Finance
In this section I study an extension to the model, where an exogenously determined
η fraction of all entrepreneurial projects require ex-ante effort costs with respect
to the secondary market trading date whereas 1 − η fraction of the entrepreneurial
projects require ex-post effort costs, such that (1− ψ1) = η1+φ and (1− ψ2) =
1−η
1+φ
as presented in chart 5. I will derive a critical level of η∗, and show that reduc-
ing financing frictions stimulate the steady-state aggregate output produced by en-
trepreneurial projects only if η ≥ η∗. I also analyze the behavior of η∗ with respect
to the equilibrium quantity of finance produced by each financier, and draw con-
clusions concerning the effects of the stage of economic development on finance-
development nexus.
6.1 Equilibrium
I denote the steady-state per-financier debt provided in the primary debt market
again with x. The aggregate capital invested in entrepreneurial production equals to
Mfx which implies that the aggregate compensation of primary savers must equal






1 +R(1 + ηφ)
.
The primary debt market clearance yields
Me =
zR(1 + φ)
1 + (1 + z)R(1 + ηφ)
, (42)
where z ≡ 1−α
α
. Using the expression for Me in the aggregate production function,
the steady-state aggregate output produced by entrepreneurial projects is stated as
W =
[R(1 + φ)]1−α








Note that, R again is determined uniquely by the endogenous occupation choice as
in sections 2-5. Therefore, ∂R/∂φ < 0 continues to hold.
Define R̃(φ) = R(1 + φ) where ∂R̃/∂φ > 0. Differentiating W with respect to
φ we can show that lowering φ would stimulate steady-state aggregate long-term
project output only if:











[1 + (1 + z)R̃(φ)]
)
(44)
Proposition 6.1 There exists a critical η∗ < 1 such that if and only if
η > η∗,
the inequality at (44) is satisfied, and financial development stimulates the steady-
state aggregate long-term project output.
With financial regime 1, financial development promotes economic development
whereas with financial financial regime 2 financial development could be counter-
productive. Proposition 6.1 shows that when the financial regime is characterized
as a combination of the two, the hybrid regime should resemble the financial regime
1 - with costly primary finance - as much as possible in order financial development
and economic growth to be positively related.
Since the quantity of finance produced by each financier in the general equilibrium





using (44) we can study the behavior of η∗ with respect to w. Note that, R(φ),





1+α . Therefore, it is useful to re-write (44)
as:
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[1 + (1 + z)R̃(φ)] (45)
Proposition 6.2 The threshold η∗ is an increasing function of w.
Proof The left hand-side of (45) is constant in w whereas the right hand side is a
decreasing function ofw. Hence, the threshold η∗ that satisfies (45) with an equality
increases as w rises. 
6.2 Discussion
The ability of financiers in converting deposits into units of finance is expected to
be higher in economically advanced societies. To this end, proposition 6.2 pro-
vides an important insight concerning the influence of economic development on
how finance and macroeconomic performance might be related: In a high income
economy, the fraction of primary financiers who incur the ex-ante costs of finance
must be relatively large compared to a developing country such that financial devel-
opment could promote the aggregate output produced by entrepreneurial projects.
This implies that in high-income countries the chances of financial development
policies to be counterproductive is relatively higher compared to low income coun-
tries. This result matches with empirical findings that point out a potential non-
monotone relationship between finance and economic development: For instance,
Castro et al. (2004) measure costly external finance by “limited investor protec-
tion” and present empirical evidence for the non-linear growth effects of financial
development. An important empirical result from their work shows that investor
protection and economic growth exhibit a negative relationship especially for high
income countries. Similar conclusions are also reached by Reinhardt and Tokatlidis
(2005). The authors show that following the implementation of domestic financial
deregulation policies, the economic growth rates in low income countries rises rel-
atively more compared to high income countries. The current theoretical analysis
suggests a role for secondary market trading in explaining this empirical pattern.
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7 Conclusion
I studied the interactions between debt financing costs, secondary market trading
and macroeconomic performance using an overlapping generations model of occu-
pation choice. The key analytical finding from the paper is the endogenous exis-
tence of a non-monotone effect of debt financing frictions on steady-state output. I
characterized the behavior of asset prices and occupational allocations with respect
to changes in financial development and showed that reducing the ex-ante financing
costs are potentially much more important for macroeconomic performance com-
pared to reducing the ex-post financing costs.
The results from sections 3 and 4 show that holding everything else constant, a
financial regime that delegates the enforcement of debt repayment to primary fi-
nanciers is less productive from a macroeconomic point of view relative to a regime
where secondary financiers incur debt financing costs. Finally, as presented in sec-
tion 5, countries with a high level of economic development are the most likely
candidates to suffer from counterproductive financial development experiences.
The theoretical results presented in this paper provide empirically testable predic-
tions and important policy conclusions. The regulatory framework as well as the
complexity of financial instruments sold in secondary markets are expected to dic-
tate whether primary or secondary financiers of long-term debt carry the burden
of debt contracts. The conclusions from my analysis suggests that policy makers
need to pay attention to the structure of financial markets and the distribution of
effort costs of providing finance across financiers in order to avoid financial sector
policies with potential counterproductive consequences.
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Table 1: A Numerical Comparison Across Models
Uniform Costs Ex-ante Costs Ex-post Costs
Agg. Cons. 100 96 102
Net Cons. 93.38 93.00 100.09
Mf/Me 2.48 2.73 2.51
R 1.22 1.21 1.31
K 23.27 23.96 23.68
W 68.78 63.90 73.25
A 7.12 6.68 7.53
α 0.61 0.61 0.61







Ā 0.90 0.90 0.90
θ 0.1 0.1 0.1
φ 0.1 0.1 0.1
Productivity process: AL,t = ĀL [1 + θWL (AL,t−1)]
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Chart 5. Heterogeneous Financing Costs
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Table 2: φ increases from 0.1 to 0.2.
Uniform Costs Ex-ante Costs Ex-post Costs
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